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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

SHEILA J. SHIPLER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930164-CA
Priority No. 2

:
INTRODUCTION

Defendant/Appellant Sheila J. Shipler relies on her opening
brief and and also refers to that brief for the statements of the
issues, jurisdiction, the case, and the facts. Appellant replies to
the State's brief as follows.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
On November 19, 1990, the trial court sentenced Ms. Shipler
"to a term in the Utah State Prison . . . not to exceed five years;
(Suspended)."

(R 30).

The court granted Ms. Shipler "a stay of the

above (prison) sentence and placed [her] on probation. . ."
(R 30).

Ms. Shipler then successfully completed probation.

(R 35).

The reduction statute squarely addresses her situation.
"Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the conviction
shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor if . . . the imposition of the
sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on probation, . . •
and [s]he is thereafter discharged without violating [her]
probation."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b).

Ms. Shipler fully

complied with the plain language of the statute; her felony
conviction should have been reduced to a misdemeanor.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE'S UNPRESERVED ARGUMENT SUGGESTS A REQUIREMENT
WHICH CANNOT BE ATTAINED AND ONE CONTRARY TO THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
For the first time on appeal, the State in its brief argued
that Ms. Shipler "ha[d] no vested right" to a reduction of her
felony conviction.

Appellee's brief, Point I.

During the lower

proceedings, however, the prosecution did not argue that Ms. Shipler
lacked a "vested right" in the reduction statute at any and all
times; it merely contended that Ms. Shipler "can't come in and use
Section 402 [the reduction statute] for a second time."

(R 85).

Contrary to the State's claim, see Appellee's brief, page 13, its
unpreserved argument should not be considered.1

Cf. State v.

Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138-39 (Utah 1989); State v. Brown, 212
Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (Utah App. 1993) (the "specificity requirement
arises out of the trial court's need to assess allegations by
isolating relevant facts and considering them in the context of the
specific legal doctrine placed at issue").

1. As noted recently by this Court, the "line" separating
preserved and unpreserved arguments is very fine and unforgiving.
See State v. Cecala, Case No. 920592-CA (Utah App. filed October 18,
1993) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) ("defendant only asserted
at trial that the false name evidence was unfairly prejudicial . . .
and did not assert that the evidence was not relevant . . . [; he]
is therefore barred from raising this argument for the first time on
appeal"); State v. Brown, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (Utah App. 1993)
("a general objection may be insufficient to preserve a specific
substantive issue for appeal").
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Aside from the preservation problems, the State7s argument
on appeal implicates serious procedural deficiencies and notice
violations.

According to its brief, "[b]ecause defendant's

probationary term was not successfully completed prior to the
effective date of the 1991 amendments, defendant's expectation of
relief never matured into a vested right in the reduction
proceedings provided for under the 1990 version of section
76-3-402(2)(b)."

Appellee's brief, page 13.

The State's argument, however, ignores the extended nature
of probation and suggests a "prerequisite" which would have been
impossible to comply with.

Ms. Shipler began her 36 month period of

probation on or about November 19, 1990.
reduction statute was in effect.

(R 30).

The 1990

Barely six months had passed

before April 29, 1991, the effective date of the 1991 reduction
statute amendments.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1991).

Ms. Shipler could not be expected to complete 36 months of probation
in a 6 month period of time.

Accord Appellee's brief, page 7

(emphasis added) (where the State acknowledged that "defendant was
not able to fulfill these preconditions prior to the effective date
of the 1991 amendments . . . " ) .

The reduction statute would be

rendered meaningless (especially if probation lasted 36 months)
because subsequent statutory amendments within that same period of
time (e.g. 36 months) makes it impossible for a probationer to
successfully complete the initially imposed term.
As it turned out, Ms. Shipler's strict adherence to the
terms of her probation prompted Adult Probation & Parole ("AP&P") to
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recommend an early termination of her probation.

See (R 35) (on

August 21, 1991, a mere 10 months after Sheila Shipler began her
probation, the trial court followed AP&P's recommendation:
"Probation be terminated as successful").

Sheila's "expectation of

relief . . . into a vested right" cannot be affected by time
limitations beyond her control.

The 1990 statute applies.

See

Harris v. Smith, 541 P.2d 343 (Utah 1975) (emphasis in original and
citations omitted) ("the law in force at the time of sentencing
governed and . . . an amendment to the statute passed after sentence
had been imposed had no effect on the matter"); Opening brief of
Ms. Shipler, page 10 n.2; Appellee's brief, page 11 n.6
Furthermore, at the time of the November 19, 1990,
sentencing proceeding, Ms. Shipler recognized that her circumstances
would fall under the plain language of the 1990 statute.

AP&P's

presentence report placed Sheila in the "Excellent" category with a
recommendation of no incarceration.
criminal record.

(R 75).

(R 74).

She had no prior

Even if Sheila had not then moved to

reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor, the reduction could
have occurred following her successful completion of probation.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990) (emphasis added) ("Whenever a
conviction is for a felony, the conviction shall be deemed to be a
misdemeanor if . . . the defendant is placed on probation, . . . and
he is thereafter discharged without violating his probation"); cf.
(R 89-90) (Ms. Shipler's counsel noted that the court could have
taken the reduction motion under advisement for the period of
probation).
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Despite the State's claims, two reductions are permitted
under the 1990 statute.

As Ms. Shipler's counsel had explained,

"there [are] a number of ways that the Court can proceed on that
[her reduction motion].

The Court can do that right now.

The Court

could allow her to complete probation and entertain our motion to
reduce this to a misdemeanor status after probation."

(R 75).

Two

reductions are now disallowed, but the 1990 version required it
where, as here, the probationer successfully completed probation.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990); State v. Baqshawf 836
P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah App. 1992) ("Section 76-3-402(2) indicates
that, when probation is successfully completed, a felony conviction
'shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor[.]").
Receiving an initial reduction at the time of sentencing
does not alter the mandatory language of the 1990 statute.

Upon

successful completion of probation and with no other relevant
requirement, subsection (2)(b) enabled Ms. Shipler to have her
felony conviction subsequently "deemed to be a misdemeanor."

See

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990).
Ms. Shipler should not be penalized for recognizing that an
initial reduction at the time of sentencing lessened the period of
possible confinement from 1-15 years (for a second degree felony) to
0-5 years (for a third degree felony).

A subsequent reduction

following probation not only entitled her to the misdemeanor
classification, such steps protected Sheila from an avoidable
contingency.

If Ms. Shipler had simply accepted the stayed

imposition of the 1-15 year term without also moving for a
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reduction, she risked a greater period of confinement (i.e. up to an
additional 10 years) in the event of a probation violation.

Counsel

for Ms. Shipler prudently represented Sheila and ensured that the
imposed sentence would not subject her to an unnecessary consequence.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT STAYED IMPOSITION OF MS. SHIPLEIES
SENTENCE
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief)
According to the State, "[a] trial court can withhold
sentence either by staying its imposition or by staying execution of
a sentence already imposed."

Appellee's brief, page 17. The former

situation the State argues, applies to the instant case.

See

Appellee's brief, page 16. However, even though "probation can also
be a sentence," the State argues that "the term 'sentence' as used
[in the reduction statute] is construed to mean the 'sentence'
specified for a third degree felony, i.e., a term of years."
Appellee's brief, page 17 n.13.

Utah's statutes do not allow for

such a construction.
Contrary to the State's claims, if a lower court withheld
sentence "by staying its imposition", there would be no final
judgment of the court.

Consequently, the involved person could not

appeal the underlying proceedings.

See Opening brief of

Ms. Shipler, page 6; State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978)
("[i]t is the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment
from which appellant has the right to appeal"); cf. State v. Casef
Case No. 930420-CA (Utah App. filed September 7, 1993) (per curiam)
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(unpublished decision) (an order which "fails to impose sentence and
provides simply that '[s]entencing has been stayed pending appeal'"
is an unappealable order) (attached in the Addendum).
More absurdly, if a trial court placed a person on
probation and revoked it (within 36 months), under the State's
selective construction of the term "probation" there would be yet
another "sentence" which the probationer could not appeal.

Neither

the initial proceeding (e.g. guilty plea to the felony charge) nor
the subsequent court ruling revoking probation would be appealable
because the trial court would have withheld "sentence" from the
outset.
Viewed another way, assume that a court does not "set" a
term of incarceration and instead places the defendant on
probation.

If no prison term was "set" and assuming probation was

successfully completed, the court would have failed to impose
"sentence" for the underlying conviction.
fail.

The State's claims2 must

The court order imposing a period of probation must remain an

appealable sentencing order.

2. In its brief, the State contends "imposition of
sentence is stayed" as long as a term of incarceration is not
stated. See Appellee's brief, page 17; (R 52). But cf. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (a probationer may be required to "serve a period
of time in the county jail not to exceed one year"). At the same
time, however, imposition of sentence is not stayed when a prison
sentence is recorded on the "Judgment, Sentence & Commitment" form.
Appellee's brief, pages 16-17. Such a position would allow a
nonexistent prison term to constitute a stayed imposition of
sentence, while a prison term—which was already imposed by the
trial court—may not later be stayed.
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A common sense reading of the reduction statute governs
this appeal.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b).

The meaning of a

"stayed imposition of sentence" cannot be limited to only
withholding prison sentences pending the successful completion of
probation.

Appellee's brief, Point II.

By statute, a "sentence"

includes more than an indeterminate term of years or "imprisonment."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1)(d).

Sentences also include

probationary terms and fines, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(1)(a) &
-201(1)(c), both of which may be used for reductions.

See Opening

Brief of Ms. Shipler, pages 8-10 (if the State's argument was
followed, "[t]he reduction statute could never be triggered if, for
example, a court "set" a sentence of a $100 fine, and immediately
stayed payment in favor of (the successful completion of)
probation").
,f

[T]he State's analysis proceeds under the [1991] amended

version of the statute[,]" Appellee's brief, page 16 n.ll, but, as
already discussed, the 1990 statute applies.

Moreover, the amended

version contains provisions which did not exist under the 1990
statute and are inapposite to the case at bar.

What is now

disallowed under the current provisions were then authorized under
the 1990 reduction statute.

That much is clear, at least by

negative implication, or there would have been no need to add the
amendments•
The proceedings are one in which the trial court had
initially noted, "What harm is done [by granting the reduction]?"
(R 86).

The court queried the prosecutor about making "motions in
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the interest of justice on occasion[,]" (R 87-88), and a reduction
here will have little impact beyond eliminating a felony from an
otherwise "clean" record.

The statutory amendments since passed now

fully address the State's concerns and few people match
Ms. Shipler's circumstances.
The trial court improperly interpreted the mandate of the
reduction statute.

Its order denying Ms. Shipler's motion should be

reversed.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Shipler respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
trial court's order of denial and reduce her conviction to a class B
misdemeanor.
SUBMITTED this

f(

day of November, 1993.

1&" £>jri
tflNO

RONALD S. for
"fttf:Defendant/Appellant
Attorney

-
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ADDENDUM
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IN TH2 OTAH C3CRT OF APPEALS
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—~ocCco~~
State of CJtah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

/•

«aiy 7. Nccnan

MEMORANDUM 0E£rsrc5Pcrt::aCcurt
(Not For P u b l i c a t i o n )

v.

Case No. 930420-CA

James 3. Case,

FILED
(September 7, 1993}

Defendant and Appellant:.

Third C i r c u i t , S a l t LaJce Department
The Honorable Robin W. Reese

Attorneys: Deborah XreecJc Mendez, Salt LaJce City, for Aooeliant
Stephen P. Zollinger, Salt LaJce City, for Appellee

Before Judges Russon, aiilings, and Greenwood (Law & Motion) .
PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on its own notice of
consideration for summary disposition, to which only appellee has
responded. We dismiss the appeal.
Defendant seeJcs to appeal his conviction for driving under
the influence, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41*6-44 (Supp.
1993), a class 3 misdemeanor. On April 23, 1993, the trial" court
signed a document entitled "Final Order Judgment and Conviction,,f
which "orders" that defendant: was found guilty of the stated
offense following a conditional guilty plea. Significantly, the
order fails to impose sentence and provides simply that
"£s]entencing has been stayed pending appeal."
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, precludes
parties from appealing non-final"judgments. A final judgment is
one that ends the proceedings between the parties, "leaving no
question open for further judicial action." State in rnterest of
T.p.e. . 743 P.2d 201, 202 (Utah. App. 1988). A judgment in a
criminal matter that fails to impose sentence does not: resolve
the proceedings between the parties, and "[ijt is the sentence
itself which constitutes a final judgment from which appellant
has the right to appeal." State v. Ggrr^rt. 584 P.2d 385, 386
(Utah 1973) . Therefore, the judgment sougftt to be appealed is
not a final order for the purposes of appeal.

The appeal is dismissed, without prejudice to the timely
filing1 of a notice of appeal after entry of a final, apoealable
order*

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

197Judith M. Billings, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1.
Defendant suggests that we remand "with appropriate
instruction regarding the stay of sentencing pending appeal.n
Since we are without appellate jurisdiction over this case, it
would be inappropriate for us to give any instruction to the
trial court regarding sentencing*

